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Abstract 
To understand sellers’ reputation status more intuitively and quickly, a hierarchical 
reputation system is routinely deployed by online C2C marketplaces, where reputation 
scores are divided into several grades shown in badges. It not only helps the consumers 
but also unintentionally introduces the incentive hierarchies to motivate sellers to 
pursuit the reputation goals. Yet the existing literature remains largely unclear whether 
sellers’ goal pursuit behavior exists in the context of electronic commerce. We gathered 
data from a large online marketplace to answer this question. The results show that 
sellers will exert more efforts (i.e., take discounts) when their absolute reputation scores 
are closer to the threshold of next grade. Moreover, low value products and high value 
products decrease more than median value products. This relationship is moderated by 
sellers’ relative position in their current grade. Our findings contribute both goal 
pursuit and online market literature and have direct managerial implications. 
Keywords:  Online C2C marketplace, goal pursuit, hierarchical reputation system, price 
 
Introduction 
The reputation system is a common design in the online C2C marketplace to address the issue of 
information asymmetry between sellers and consumers. As the raw reputation score in a detail number 
is not intuitive enough for consumers to quickly understand sellers’ reputation status, the reputation 
systems usually design a hierarchical reputation system, such as Taobao.com, the largest online 
marketplace worldwide. The reputation scores are divided into several grades according to some 
thresholds. More specifically, after a transaction is completed on Taobao.com website, both buyer and 
seller can evaluate each other, with a rating of +1 (positive), 0 (neutral), or −1 (negative), accompanied 
with optional textual or picture comments. Once the seller accumulates a sufficient number of rating 
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scores, the reputation grade on the site will be elevated into 21 different seller reputation grades from 
“red heart”, “blue diamond”, “blue crown”, to “golden crowns” as Figure 1 shows.  
 
Figure 1. Reputation score and reputation grade in Taobao.com 
In this kind of hierarchical reputation system, each grade has its badge. Since pictures are more intuitive 
than specific numbers, it is easier for consumers to compare badges than numeric scores. It means a 
seller with one more score only but a higher-level badge than the other seller would be treated as a much 
more trustable seller by consumers. For example, one seller with 10,001 reputation score might be 
trusted more than another seller with 10,000 reputation score, due to the difference of their reputation 
grade badges. Therefore, such a hierarchical system unintentionally introduces incentive hierarchies for 
sellers. 
Abundant literature (Blal and Sturman 2014; Wu et al. 2015; Xie et al. 2017) study on the effect of 
reputation system on sellers’ profits. It has been found that good reputation performance has a positive 
effect on sellers’ profit, both product sales (Elfenbein et al. 2014) and price (Ba and Pavlou 2002), 
through effecting potential consumers’ consideration set during the process of their purchasing decision-
making (Kowk et al. 2017). 
In online C2C markets practice, the majority of sellers have realized the crucial roles of reputation 
system (Chen and Xie 2008), both reputation score and, particularly, reputation grade on their profit. 
Hence, some sellers who are close to the next grade is very likely to exert more utilitarian efforts, e.g. 
offering special deals to upgrade quickly. Figure 2 shows an example. Such discount promotion is a kind 
of sellers’ marketing strategies for upgrading to the next blue-crown grade. 
With regard to goal pursuit behavior in online websites, the recent extant literature refers to various 
contexts, such as knowledge exchange website (Goes et al. 2016), or the consumers’ goal pursuit 
behavior in electronic commerce websites(Sellier and Chattopadhyay 2009). However, despite its 
popularity in practice, little attention has been paid on whether sellers’ goal pursuit behavior actually 
exists even has a significant effect on sellers’ behavior in online C2C markets.  The goal of this paper is 
to emprically examine if sellers’ goal pursuit behavior setting reputation grade as goals actually exists 
in the context of an online marketplace, Taobao.com. 
Since each reputation grade of the hierarchy reputaion system can be regarded as “goal” for sellers,  like 
prior study (Goes et al. 2016) in contex of online knowledge exchange site, this study draws on the goal-
setting theory in management to examin its effect on sellers’ marketing efforts. However, the research 
backgrounds are significantly different between online knowledge exchange and online marketplace 
backgrounds. Specifically, UGC in online knowledge exchange sites can be taken as “public goods” 
(Goes et al. 2016) which review publishers need not contribute their effort to enjoy the benefit of UGC 
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sites. In contrast, the reputation grade in online marketplaces can be taken as “private goods” which 
sellers need to take their effort to enjoy the benefit of a higher reputation grade. Meanwhile, the majority 
of sellers have realized the critical effect of higher reputation grades on sellers’ profits. Sellers may be 
driven by significant economic and utilitarian motivition to take intended marketing actions. 
In particular, the goal-setting theory demonstrates that human being will be likely to exert more effort 
before they reach goals than after (Heath et al. 1999). Therefore, the research questions that we seek to 
address in this study are: 
1. How do sellers’ effort levels change when they are closer to reputaion goals?  
2. If sellers do exert great efforts to seek the goals of higher reputation grade, what’s the specific 
relationship between effort level and reputation scores required to upgrade? And what’s the 
moderating effect of seller’s relative distance in current grade? 
We collected data for all sellers selling Canon IXUS 255, a popular digital camera, from Taobao.com 
on April 21st, 2014. Price and ratings of all historical transactions since the establishment of the shops 
were retrieved. A linear regression model with fixed effect was built to explore sellers’ goal pursuit 
behavior.  
 
Figure 2. Offering special deals for upgrading in Taobao.com 
This paper applies the goal-setting theory to investigate the users’ goal pursuit behavior in online 
marketplace empirically and has two main findings. One is that sellers’ goal pursuit behavior actually 
exists in online markets. More specifically, mean price becomes lower when sellers’ absolute reputation 
scores are approaching closer to the threshold of the next grade. In addition, low value products and 
high value products decrease more than media value products. The other is the seller’s relative distance 
in current grade moderate the relationship between mean price and absolute distance to the next grade 
threshold. The results have several theoretical contributions and managerial implications which will be 
discussed in the conclusion section.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section of relevant literature review states related extant 
literature by reviewing reputation system and goal pursuit. Following sections demonstrate our 
hypotheses development, data, and methodology. Empirical results are then displayed. The paper ends 
with discussion and conclusion. 
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Literature review 
This section reviews literature related to our study. We begin by reviewing two streams of literature, i.e. 
online reputation and goal pursuit, which directly inform our empirical tests. We then discuss how our 
study differentiates from prior research work. 
Online reputation 
Reputation systems are widely adopted by online marketplaces. These systems often rely on feedbacks 
from users with regard to their prior experience with a seller or a product, and the information is 
aggregated to form the reputation of sellers in the market. A substantial amount of research has been 
conducted on reputation system of online marketplaces since it can reduce information asymmetry and 
facilitate transactions between sellers and buyers (Dewally and Ederington 2006). The reputation system 
of online marketplaces presents a number of interesting research questions, particularly on the effect of 
reputation ratings on sales volume (Floyd et al. 2014) and sales price (Ba and Pavlou 2002).  A great 
many of literature (Ghose and Ipeirotis 2011; Sparks et al. 2013) demonstrated that sellers’ better 
reputation has a positive effect on his/her profit significantly. For example, Mikhail and Alm (2002) 
assess the relationship between the quality of a seller’s reputation and the auction prices of her list items 
and the willingness of buyers to bid on these items, using sales data of 1999 mint condition US$5 gold 
coins collected from eBay. Similarly, Houser and Wooder (2006) assess the relationship between 
positive seller reputation rating and final product sales using sales data of computer CPU collected from 
eBay. They find that an increase of positive ratings from 0 to 15 results in an increase of about 5% in 
the final sales price. Ye et al. (2009) investigated the Taobao’s reputation mechanism and found that the 
volume of positive reviews affects consumers’ willingness to buy positively. Ba and Pavlou(2002) 
conducted an online field experiment and demonstrated that positive ratings have a strong impact on 
price premiums. These results point to a highly significant, and sizable, impact of reputation on sellers’ 
profits. 
Moreover, in the hierarchical reputation system, each reputation grade has its badge. Since many studies 
have proved the graphic content brings consumers powerful expression (Grass and Wallace 1974), and 
is more influential than textual content (Mitchell 1986), it is easier for consumers to compare different 
sellers’ badges than their detail reputation scores. Thus, sellers of the online marketplace have 
reasonable motivation to adopt goal pursuit behavior in order to achieve more profits. 
Goal pursuit behavior 
Goal pursuit behaviors have been investigated by psychologists since more than half a century 
ago(Bonezzi et al. 2011; Hull 1931; Miller 1944). As one of the earliest empirical studies, Hull (1931) 
revealed the relationship between efforts levels and distance to goals through animal experiments, since 
they found that rats ran faster when their distances to food were shorter. Such goal pursuit behavior 
research extended to human beings, for example, Lewin et al. (1944) employed survey to demonstrate 
that people could exert some efforts to achieve their goals. Some recent literature (Custers and Aarts 
2010; Labroo and Kim 2009) about goal pursuit of human beings found that people were able to exert a 
higher level of efforts after setting goals. Laran (2016) discussed that conscious and unconscious goal 
interact consumer goal pursuit. 
In addition, some scholars discussed the effect of setting goals on goal pursuit behavior. For example, 
Locke (1967) put forward the goal-setting theory of motivation, which demonstrates that people would 
achieve better task performance when they set goals. Moreover, some literature (Tubbs 1986, Mento et 
al. 1987, Locke and Latham 2002) about goal-setting theory states that specific and challenging goals 
along with appropriate feedback contribute to higher and better task performance. In addition, some 
scholars(Huang and Szu 2011) discussed the motivational consequences of perceived velocity in 
consumer goal pursuit. Cheema et al.(2011) demonstrated that as individuals approach a goal, external 
representations which increase the ease of visualizing this goal enhance goal pursuit. Wadhwa and 
Kim(2015) proposed that just failing to obtain a reward nearly winning in one task leads to broader, 
positive motivational effects on subsequent unrelated tasks relative to clearly losing or actually obtaining 
the reward. 
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Furthermore, some studies focus on the goal pursuit behavior in online websites. For example, Li (2012) 
quantified the incentive short-term effect of badges on user engagement in online Q&A communities. 
Anderson et al. (2013) demonstrated that users would exert more efforts in order to achieve grade badges. 
Goes et al. (2016) found evidence that incentive hierarchies might motivate users to contribute more 
before they achieve the goals, user contribution levels dropped significantly after that, in the context of 
online knowledge exchange. Wang et al. (2009) constructed a dual-process goal pursuit model to explain 
consumers’ information contribution to electronic word-of-mouth system. Sellier (2009) examined how 
the length of time for which a goal is interrupted affects goal pursuit, in an online context. Liu et al. 
(2018) demonstrated the effect of incentive hierarchies on users behavior during status seeking, using 
the data from TripAdvisor and found that users are more eager for quick promotion and utilitarianism 
results in fewer words per review. 
The above literature demonstrated many insightful findings which are related to our research questions 
considering goal pursuit theories or behaviors. However, we are interested in the background of online 
marketplaces and sellers’ specific marketing actions for pursuing reputation goals. 
Hypotheses development 
Drawing on the literature reviewed in the previous subsection, we study the effect of reputation grade 
goals as incentive hierarchy on sellers’ effort level in the online marketplace. We propose our hypotheses 
as follows. 
The goal-gradient hypothesis posits that motivation increases in proximity to goals (Hull 1931; Ran et 
al. 2006). The ultimate goal of sellers in a marketplace is to earn more profit. To achieve this goal, sellers 
could either set a higher price to have more profit per sold or set a lower price to sell more. In online 
marketplaces, the reputation score is served to address the information asymmetry issue, and thereby 
sellers with higher reputation could enjoy the price premium generated by the trust (Ba and Pavlou 2002). 
In online hierarchical reputation systems which have been deployed in the most online marketplace, 
reputation scores have been divided into several grades. The grade badge will be displayed next to the 
seller’s name on all product pages in his/her shop instead of the numeric score which is only visible on 
the seller’s reputaion profile page.  For example, sellers with reputation score between 5001 and 10000 
have a “five diamonds” badge, and sellers with reputation score between 10001 and 20000 have a “one 
blue crown” badge. As pictures are more intuitive and conspicuous than specific numbers for consumers 
to read and understand the information quickly, a seller with 10000 reputation score (“five diamonds”) 
might be treated as the same as a seller with 5001 reputation score (“five diamonds”) and much lower 
than a seller with 10001 reputation score (“one blue crown”). It means that one more score (10001 v.s. 
10000) exceeding the threshold might make the seller enjoy the benefit of price premium or more sales 
since the grades are different, while 4999 more scores (10000 v.s. 5001) in the same grade interval might 
not have this role. Sellers in online hierarchical reputation systems would like to pursuit the reputation 
grade instead of the score merely, and each grade could be treated as a goal. We, therefore, focus on the 
reputaion grade hierarchy in this study. 
When sellers are approaching the goals (i.e. reputation score is closer to the threshold of next grade), 
they will take more effort to reach it (Custers and Aarts 2010; Goes et al. 2016; Labroo and Kim 2009). 
As the reputation scores are earned by feedback of products sold (1 for one positive feedback), the sellers 
need to sell more to upgrade more quickly. Taking discount is a common way to promote sales. 
Therefore, the sellers are likely to reduce the price to earn reputation quickly. Following the logic, we 
propose, 
Hypothesis 1: The price will be lower when the seller’s absolute distance to the next higher reputation 
score level is smaller.  
Under the framework of the reference point (Heath et al. 1999; Larrick et al. 2009), users’ optimal 
decision is to attain the goal threshold but not exceed it too much when they are close to the threshold. 
After achieving a certain grade, the seller will be encouraged by the hierarchical reputation system to 
try next higher goal. However, they may consider the attainability of next goal and hesitate to take efforts 
because of the tremendous distance to the next threshold (Zhang and Huang 2010). In Taobao’s 
hierarchical reputation system, the reputation score required increases sharply once reputation grade is 
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higher. For example, the seller in the grade of “one blue diamond” needs 250 more reputation scores to 
upgrade into next grade of “two blue diamonds”; Comparatively, the seller in the grade of “one golden 
crown” needs 500,000 reputation scores to upgrade into next grade of “two golden diamonds”. Thus, in 
online marketplaces, it is not a wise and practical marketing strategy for sellers to discount by burning 
money all the time without regard to current grade. Consequently, we hypothesize that sellers’ 
motivation to upgrade through discount will be reduced when the relative positon is sheer to the next 
threshold, where the relative position is defined as the ratio of distance to the next grade to total 
reputation scores of the current grade. 
Hypothesis 2: Seller’s relative position in current level will negatively moderate the relationship 
between price and the absolute distance.  
Data and methodology 
Data collection 
Data in this study was obtained on April 21st, 2014 from Taobao.com, the largest C2C online 
marketplace worldwide. Although the data is old, it is still effective since the whole setting does not 
change a lot in Taobao.com. A java based crawler was developed to collect data. Firstly, all data of 
sellers selling Canon IXUS 255 at that time were retrieved. Canon IXUS 255 was one of the most 
popular digital cameras at that time, and it ensures there were enough sellers. We finally obtained a 
seller list containing 244 sellers. Then, all historical reviews with transaction information since establish 
of shops were crawled for each seller. There are two types of historical reviews in Taobao.com. One is 
reviews in the recent half year, and the other is reviews received half a year ago. Taobao.com only 
provides reviews up to 100 pages (i.e. 2,000 reviews) for the former one, while it provides a full list of 
reviews for the latter one. As some super sellers might receive more than 2,000 reviews in a half year, 
it is quite possible that some reviews would be missed if we simply merge these two types of reviews 
together. The missed reviews would cause difficulty and biases in both variable construction and 
empirical analysis. Therefore, only reviews received before half a year were used in this study, i.e. 
reviews posted before October 21st, 2013. Historical review information includes ratings (positive = 1, 
neutral = 0, negative = -1) and rating time, while transaction information contains item price and item 
title.  
Since Taobao.com will automatically give a positive rating to sellers in the name of buyers in case that 
the buyers do not write reviews 15 days after they received the products, the under report bias does not 
exist in our dataset. It means we have all reviews with transaction information before October 21st 
2013for these 244 sellers. One issue in this dataset is that it does not provide the transaction time. Our 
study employed the review time to address this issue for two reasons. First, it is reasonable to assume 
that the time lag between purchasing and rating will not fluctuate much. Second, as hypothesized above, 
sellers would take goal pursuit strategy, i.e. reducing the price, when they are approaching the next grade. 
However, the price reduction will not last until they reach the next grade. Since Taobao.com will 
automatically give a rating, the number of reviews in the future is equal to the number of products sold 
in recent days. As a result, sellers could estimate the increment of their reputation in the future according 
to their past positive rating ratio and recent sales. When the increment of reputation in the future meets 
the requirement to upgrade, it is unnecessary to promote. Therefore, it is quite possible that buyers, who 
make purchasing during the period between the day that sellers have sold enough products to upgrade 
in the future and the actual upgrading day, will not enjoy the discount.  
One seller could sell several types of products in a day. He/she might provide a discount on some 
products, while hold price on other products. Therefore, it is better to analyze at the aggregate level than 
the transaction/review level in order to capture the effort of sellers. As a result, a seller-daily level panel 
data was constructed in this study for empirical analysis. It means that information of a seller in a day 
constitutes one observation. As it is unable to observe the product information if there was not any 
transaction in a day, the data is a panel data with time gaps. 
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Variables and empirical model 
The dependent variable in this study is the average price of sold products for seller i at day t (Pricei,t). 
Mean price is able to reflect sellers’ price reduction for any products as long as the price of other products 
does not increase. This assumption is reasonable that increment of other products’ price will have a 
negative effect on sellers’ goal pursuit to the higher levels. Therefore, Pricei,t could be served as the 
dependent variable. 
Absolute distance(AD) to the threshold of next grade is measured by reputation scores required to 
upgrade while relative distance (RD) is calculated as the percentage of reputation scores required to the 
next grade in the total reputation scores of current grade interval. Sellers’ reputation score (Rep) and the 
positive ratio (PR) are also included as control variables since they will influence the price (Ba and 
Pavlou 2002; Ye et al. 2013). All variables in our study are listed with the description in Table 1, and 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics. 
Table 1. Variables 
Variable Description 
Pricei,t Mean price of products sold by seller i at the beginning of day t. 
ADi,t Absolute distance for seller i at the beginning of day t. 
RDi,t Relative distance for seller i at the beginning of day t. 
Repi,t Reputation score of seller i at the beginning of day t. 
PRi,t Positive ratio of seller i at the beginning of day t. 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 76,832 1,477.203 1,984.818 0.01 66,000 
AD 76,832 1,725.652 4,452.993 1 29,999 
RD 76,832 0.575 0.288 0.0001 1 
Rep 76,832 2,871.303 4,728.268 0 26,939 
PR 76,832 0.907 0.093 0 1 
In this study, a linear panel regression model with fixed effect is introduced. The fixed effect in this 
model includes seller-specific fixed effect and time-specific fixed effect. For each seller, there might be 
unobserved seller-specific heterogeneities that could influence the price, such as the cost, preference in 
operating the shop. Thus, the seller-specific fixed effect is included to account for such time-invariant 
individual-specific effects. In addition, for each period, there might exist unobserved time-specific 
heterogeneities, like market competition, market average price, etc. Hence, the time-specific fixed effect 
is included to account for such time-specific effects. One month is defined as a period in this study. 
Consequently, our model is proposed as follows: 
ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଶܴܦ௜,௧ ∗ ܣܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܴܦ௜,௧ ൅ ߚସܴ݁݌௜,௧ ൅ ߚହܴܲ௜,௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧       (1) 
where ߙ௜ is the individual-specific fixed effect, ߠ௧ is the time-specific fixed effect, and ߝ௜,௧ is the random 
error. In this model, ߚଵ captures the effect of absolute distance on mean price: a positive value of ߚଵ represents the price will be lower when the seller is closer to the next grade. ߚଶ captures the moderate effect of relative distance on the relationship between absolute distance and mean price. 
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Empirical results 
Main results 
The model is estimated by OLS with seller-specific fixed effect and time-specific fixed effect, and the 
results are reported in Table 3. According to the table, H1 is supported since the coefficient of AD is 
significantly positive. The results show that mean price will decrease when the sellers are approaching 
the next grade. It indicates that sellers in Taobao.com are motivated to upgrade by discounting their 
products to sell more. More specially, one reputation score closer will lead to 0.107 RMB decrement in 
average price. Considering the fact that most sellers need hundreds or even thousands of reputation 
scores to upgrade, the decrement of average price is magnificent.  
Table 3. Main results 
 Coef.(Std. Err.) 
AD 0.107(0.0206)*** 
RD*AD -0.107(0.0202)*** 
RD 70.618(23.9795)*** 
Rep -0.026(0.0044)*** 
PR -315.142(91.4901)*** 
N 76,832 
adj. R2 0.033 
F 26.309 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, monthly fixed effect included 
H2 investigating the moderate effect of relative distance on the relation between AD and Price is also 
supported since the coefficient of RD*AD is negative and significant. The results suggest that holding 
the AD fixed, sellers’ motivation to upgrade by reducing price is weaker when the relative position is 
farther away from the threshold of the next grade. One notable thing is the coefficient of RD*AD is the 
opposite number of the coefficient of AD. As the value RD is in the range of from 0 to 1, it indicates that 
a seller does not have any motivation to upgrade by promotion when he/she has just successfully 
upgraded. 
Additional tests 
Although the mean price of sold products could capture the price reduction, there is one possible issue 
which will lead to a bias. The change of mean price might be caused by the change in consumer demand. 
For example, if it is observed that the mean price becomes lower than before, one possible reason might 
be consumers has bought more low value product, i.e., the proportion of low value products in total sales 
is higher than before. To address this issue, the dependent variable is replaced by percentiles of the price 
of sold products. Five percentiles were selected: 5th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th 
percentile, and 95th percentile. We run the regression model again for these five price percentiles 
respectively, and the results are reported in Table 4.  
As all coefficients of AD are significantly positive and all coefficients of RD*AD are significantly 
negative, the results for different price segments are consistent with the main results in Table 3. It further 
illustrates that sellers would reduce the price for all products to upgrade quickly. In addition, there is an 
interesting phenomenon in the different price segments regression results. The influencing power of 
absolute distance (AD) to the next grade in different price segments prohibits a U-curve pattern. These 
five coefficients are drawn in Figure 3 with their 95% confidence interval. The influencing power in 
low price products and high price products is larger than the influencing power in median price products. 
More specifically, the influencing power in 95th percentile price segment is more than twice than the 
influencing power in 25th and 50th percentile price segment. Meanwhile, the influencing power in 5th 
 Sellers’ Goal Pursuit of the Reputation Grade 
 Twenty-Second Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Japan 2018  
and 75th percentile price segments are about 50% larger than the influencing power in 25th and 50th 
percentile price segment. This result suggests that sellers are more likely to promote the low value 
products and high value products instead of the median value products. One possible explanation is that 
the market competition of the median value products is quite fierce so that the regular price is already 
the lowest price which sellers could afford.  
Table 4. Different price segments results 
 5th 
percentile 
25th 
percentile 
50th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
95th 
percentile 
AD 0.112*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.113*** 0.188*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0207) (0.0265) (0.0324) 
RD*AD -0.094*** -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.121*** -0.202*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0259) (0.0317) 
RD 9.226 36.597 59.016** 125.376*** 131.302*** 
 (22.4723) (22.4629) (24.1100) (30.7983) (37.7092) 
Rep -0.055*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.014** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0069) 
PR -94.838 -203.260** -245.885*** -331.487*** -849.978*** 
 (85.7397) (85.7037) (91.9880) (117.5061) (143.8738) 
N 76,832 76,832 76,832 76,832 76,832 
adj. R2 0.015 0.020 0.029 0.031 0.035 
F 13.335 17.301 23.478 25.208 28.266 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; monthly fixed effect 
included 
 
Figure 3. The influencing power with 95% CI at different price segments 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study explores the effect of hierarchical online reputation systems on sellers’ goal pursuit behavior 
in online marketplaces by drawing on the goal-setting theory. We also show the importance of taking 
relative distance ratio into consideration. Specifically, using seller data of Canon IXUS 255 collected 
from Taobao.com, we investigate how would the price change when sellers are approaching the next 
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grade closer by introducing a panel data regression model. The empirical analysis shows two main 
findings. First, a seller’s average price of his/her products would be lower when the absolute distance of 
the seller’s reputation score is closer to the next grade. Moreover, high value products and low value 
products are influenced more than median value products. Second, the relative distance ratio in current 
reputation grade has a moderate effect on the relationship between the average price and the absolute 
distance to the next grade.  
This study yields several contributions on both goal pursuit literature and online market literature. First, 
to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first attempt at exploring the goal pursuit behavior of 
sellers in the online market. In extant goal pursuit literature, the goal is often a kind of explicit return, 
like free of the membership fee (Goes et al. 2016). However, the goal of sellers in online market in this 
study is the reputation grade, which only has a potential to earn return like price premium. Therefore, 
this study contributes the goal pursuit literature by investigating the effect of uncertainty return on goal 
pursuit behavior. Second, our results help to explain the negative relationship between price and seller 
reputation in online marketplace (Ye et al. 2013) since missing of the goal pursuit behavior in the model 
caused estimation bias.  
The results also have managerial implications. Although sellers’ goal pursuit via taking discount seems 
to benefit the consumers on the platform, it actually harms the sellers. They could not fully enjoy the 
price premium of reputation. On the other hand, consumers would take more time to decide which one 
to choose. Might they wonder that is the goal pursuit sellers really reliable since the price is lower than 
both sellers with higher reputation and lower reputation? Therefore, the goal pursuit behavior might lead 
to some kind of chaos in the online market. The online market managers should design a better online 
reputation system to avoid the chaos and benefit both sellers and consumers.  
Our study bears several limitations. First, product-specific heterogeneity is failed to account due to the 
data limitation. Product heterogeneity such as the stage in life cycle would influence its price. As our 
data only contains the transaction title, it is unable to identify products exactly. More data is required to 
address this issue in future. Second, the influencing power in different price segments has not been 
statistically examined, and the underlying reason is also not explored. We would conduct further studies 
in the future after data with product label is collected. Third, although we have confirmed that sellers 
have the goal pursuit behavior, it is more interesting to investigate whether the goal pursuit behavior 
benefits the sellers in the future. It would be a direction in our future studies. 
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